The self-represented Applicant sought permission to Appeal an Order from the Trial Judge that dismissed the Applicant’s three Actions for damages against the Respondents. The Actions were for damages arising from separate motor vehicle accidents. The Respondents admitted liability and as a result, the Trial was to determine damages. The Trial Judge determined that the Applicant was not entitled to any damages and dismissed the claims.

The Applicant was subject to an Interim Court Access Restriction Order that was pending on a Decision from an Application for a Vexatious Litigant Order. Strekaf J., following Rule 14.5(1)(j), was satisfied that due to the presence of the Interim Court Access Restriction Order, the Applicant was required to obtain permission to appeal the Trial Decision. Justice Strekaf clarified that if an individual is subject to a Vexatious Litigant Order, they are considered a vexatious litigant under Rule 14.5(1)(j).

The Court followed the criteria set out in Tican and Thompson v Procrane Inc (Sterling Crane), 2016 ABCA 71 to determine whether to grant permission to Appeal: The Applicant must demonstrate an important question of law, a reasonable likelihood of success, and that the Appeal will not cause undue delays or prejudice. As a result, Strekaf J. granted the Applicant permission to Appeal the Trial Judge’s Decision.

The Applicant alleged that the Trial Judge breached Rule 4.15. However, the Court determined the circumstances did not give rise to a breach of Rule 4.15 because the Trial Judge would not become the Case Management Judge until after the damages trial. This Ground of Appeal was held to be without merit and permission to Appeal on these grounds was not granted.

The Applicant also sought a Stay of the Trial Judge’s Costs Order pending the resolution of the Appeal. The Respondents argued that Strekaf J. did not have jurisdiction to grant a Stay of the Costs Order because the Applicant did not apply to Appeal the Costs Order and the Appeal period expired. Justice Strekaf was satisfied pursuant to Rule 14.9(b) that the requirement that separate Notices of Appeal must be filed for each Decision that is appealed does not apply to a decision on Costs for the same Hearing and that the Applicant still had the option to bring an Application to Amend the Notice of Appeal to include an Appeal of the Costs Judgment.

The Court noted that when a Stay is sought pending Appeal pursuant to Rule 14.48, the tripartite test from RJR-MacDonald Inc v Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 SCR 311 applies: (1) Is there a serious question to be tried as opposed to a frivolous and vexatious one?; (2) Would the Applicant suffer irreparable harm if the stay is refused?; and (3) If the stay is refused, will the Applicant suffer greater harm than the respondent would suffer if the stay were granted?

Justice Strekaf was satisfied that it would not be appropriate to grant a Stay in this case because there was a lack of established irreparable harm from denying the Stay and the balance of convenience did not weigh in favour of granting one. The Application for a Stay of the Costs Order pending Appeal was dismissed.