The matter dealt with an Application to dismiss an Action due to long delay, pursuant to Rule 4.33. On November 1, 2019, Lennart Werner Treeter filed its Statement of Claim (the “Claim”) against the Defendants, James Prudhon, Iverson Trucking Ltd. and John Doe (collectively the “Defendants”). The Claim was served on Iversen Trucking Ltd. (“Iversen”) on September 11, 2020, and on December 2, 2020, an Order dispensing with service upon James Prudhon was granted, following his death. The Statement of Defence was ultimately filed on behalf of Iversen on July 8, 2024. On October 29, 2024, the Defendants brought an Application which sought to dismiss the Action for delay pursuant to Rule 4.33, or alternatively Rule 4.31. Specifically, the Court was tasked with answering whether or not the filing of a Statement of Defence is a significant advance in an action.

The Defendants argued that the Action should be dismissed for delay under Rule 4.33, asserting that the filing of a boilerplate Statement of Defence did not significantly advance the Action. They relied on the decision in Déjà vu Holdings Ltd v Securex Master Limited Partnership, 2018 ABQB 597 (“Déjà vu”), to support their position. The Plaintiffs contended that the filing of the Statement of Defence constituted a significant advance of the Action, distinguishing Déjà vu and relying on Ursa Ventures Ltd v Edmonton (City), 2016 ABCA 135, which emphasized a functional approach to determining whether a step significantly advances an action. Applications Judge Summers found that the finding in Déjà vu was distinguishable on the basis that it dealt with whether the filing of a Statement of Defence to Counterclaim constituted a significant advance of an action.

The Court concluded that the nature, value, importance and quality of the Statement of Defence was such that the pleading moved the Action forward in an essential way and consequently was a significant advance in the Action. The Application to dismiss for long delay was dismissed.