This Appeal concerned the enforceability of a Consent Final Property Order (the “Order”) in a family law dispute. The Parties were in a relationship from around 2011 to 2020.

The Order was granted after the Parties separated, stipulating that the Respondent would keep the matrimonial home but had to refinance it to remove the Appellant’s debt exposure. If refinancing was not possible, the home was to be sold, with the Respondent keeping the proceeds. However, the Respondent could not refinance.  The Appellant blocked the sale unless the net proceeds were to be held in trust for further litigation.

The Respondent cross-applied to hold the Appellant in contempt of the Order and sought approval to sell the home. The Chambers Judge did not find the Appellant in contempt but allowed the sale, with the proceeds going to the Respondent. On Appeal, the Appellant argued the Order was ineffective or unenforceable. He argued the terms of the matrimonial property division were unfair, and the proceeds of the matrimonial home should be held in trust pending further litigation.

Referring to Rule 9.15, regarding setting aside, varying and discharging judgments and orders, the Court of Appeal noted that while titled an “order”, the Consent Final Property Order was actually a final Judgment of the Court below, and therefore subject to challenge on only very limited grounds. There was the theoretical possibility that the Appellant could appeal the Order, but he would have required permission to appeal under Rule 14.5(1)(d), because it was “a decision made on the consent of the parties”. That permission and any resulting appeal had to be launched within one month of the date of pronouncement of the Judgment. With the deadline having passed, the prospect of appeal was spent.

The Court of Appeal wrote that there are very limited grounds for setting aside a Judgment of the Court below, particularly a consent Judgment. A person challenging a final consent Judgment must bring an action alleging a serious defect in the Judgment, usually amounting to fraud or duress.

In conclusion, the Appellant failed to show any reviewable error in the decision of the Chambers Judge, and the Appeal was dismissed.