This was an Appeal from a Decision following a Trial where the Appellant was found liable for defamation and permanently enjoined from making similar statements in the future. The Appellant raised multiple grounds of appeal, including arguments under Rules 14.5 and 5.33.

The Appellant’s submitted that the Trial Judge erred by proceeding with the Trial contrary to a prior Order setting specific Trial dates. Noting that neither party requested the Court to consider Rule 14.5(1)(b), the Court nonetheless addressed the issue on its merits. It held that trial scheduling remained within the Court’s discretion and the prior Order did not preclude the Court from exercising its authority to manage its own process.

Rule 5.33 was engaged when the Appellant objected to the Respondents’ attempt to rely on an email obtained in the discovery process of a related action, invoking the implied undertaking rule. The Trial Judge excluded the email and determined that no sanction was necessary. The Court of Appeal upheld this approach and found no reviewable error in the Trial Judge’s treatment of the issue.

The Appeal was dismissed in all respects except with respect to the scope of an injunction. The Court found the language in the original Judgment overly broad, particularly as it extended to commentary about the Town’s administration generally. The injunction was narrowed to prohibit the Appellant from directly or indirectly stating, suggesting, or implying that the Respondents had acted in a corrupt or criminal manner. Costs were awarded to the Respondents under Schedule C, Column 1.