Following the breakdown of a long-term marriage, the Parties separated in 2018 and divorced in June 2024. In 2022, a Consent Order directed that the matrimonial home be sold, with the proceeds held in trust pending either an agreement between the Parties or a further Order of the Court (the “Consent Order”). However, the sale did not occur, and disputes over the property persisted. As a result, the Parties were directed to attend morning chambers.

The Respondent applied to enforce the Consent Order (the “Enforcement Application”). Rather than responding within the prescribed timelines, the Appellant filed an ex parte Desk Application and obtained an Order granting her exclusive possession of the matrimonial home. That Order was subsequently vacated, and the Appellant then filed a Cross-Application seeking exclusive possession and the right to purchase the Respondent’s interest in the property. In reply, the Respondent submitted an Affidavit seeking relief different from that originally requested in the Enforcement Application—specifically, an Order permitting him to buy out the Appellant’s interest in the property. The Chambers Judge ultimately granted this relief under Section 15 of the Law of Property Act, RSA 2000, c L-7 (the “LPA”) (the “Chambers Order”).

The Appellant argued that the Chambers Judge erred in granting relief that was different from what was sought in the Enforcement Application. The Court rejected this argument, confirming that the purpose of Rule 6.3(2)(d), which requires an application to reference any provision of an enactment or rule being relied upon, is to ensure that a respondent has adequate notice of the basis for the application and a fair opportunity to respond.

The Court noted that the record clearly demonstrated the Appellant was aware that the Respondent was seeking different relief, and even addressed case law concerning such changes in oral submissions before the Chambers Judge. Although it would have been preferable for the Respondent to have expressly cited Section 15 of the LPA in the Enforcement Application, the Court held that the Appellant had adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond. As such, the procedural irregularities did not amount to a reversible error.

Accordingly, the Appeal was dismissed.