ALBERTA (MINISTER OF JUSTICE) v VIAL, 2026 ABKB 618

The Appellants appealed an Applications Judge’s decision to dismiss their Application to strike the Respondent’s Statement of Claim. The Respondent’s Statement of Claim alleged that the Appellants had breached their duty of care in exercising their powers under the Maintenance Enforcement Act, RSA 2000, c M-1 by suspending the Respondent’s passport notwithstanding that their employment required them to travel internationally, and that doing so adversely impacted the Respondent’s ability to earn income. The Application was dismissed the by the presiding Applications Judge, and the Appellants subsequently appealed the dismissal.

The Court noted that as the Appeal arose from the decision of an Applications Judge, it was to be reviewed for correctness. However, pursuant to Rule 6.14, the Appeal may also include relevant and material new evidence. As such, the Appellants were permitted to evidence that was not before the Applications Judge when the Appellants’ Application was initially heard.

Justice Magnan considered Rule 3.68 and the underlying principles governing applications to strike a claim; namely that a pleading must be read generously and may only be struck where it is plain and obvious and discloses no valid claim. In considering such an application, the Court is not expected to undertake an assessment of the merits, and if the claim itself is properly pleaded, it should not be struck merely because it appears dubious.

The Appellants raised three separate issues with the Respondent’s Statement of Claim that they submitted permitted it to be struck. It was argued that the claim represented a collateral attack and abuse of process, that the Respondent did not disclose a reasonable cause of action, and that any claim brought by the Respondent ought to barred by the Limitations Act, RSA 2000, c L-12.

The Court disagreed with the Appellants submissions on all fronts. The Appellants submitted that the Respondent’s Action was an abuse of process because rather than appealing the Court Order that suspended their passport, they commenced an Action against the Appellants. The Court disagreed. Because the claim sought to target the mishandling of the Appellants’ enforcement powers rather than a variation of prior Court Orders, it was concerned with the cause rather than the consequence.

With respect to the position that the Respondent’s Statement of Claim lacked a reasonable cause of action, the Court noted the generous reading of the alleged material facts from which bad faith may be inferred. If the Appellants were found to be acting in bad faith, then it would support the Respondent’s allegations of breach of duty on the part of the Appellants.

Finally, and with respect to the Appellants’ arguments that the claim was barred by operation of the Limitations Act, Justice Mangan noted that the Respondent’s Statement of Claim noted several facts that the Respondent only discovered after they had occurred; such as misclassifying their employment and acknowledgements by the Appellants of their mistakes. As these facts only came to be known by the Respondent long after they occurred, the claim was not clearly brought out of time.

Ultimately, the Court dismissed the Appeal and directed that the Respondent be entitled to costs.