KEYES v KEYES, 2026 ABKB 661

The Defendant applied under the Court’s inherent jurisdiction to remove the Plaintiff’s counsel of record from their contested family law proceeding. The Defendant claimed that the Plaintiff’s counsel would likely become a necessary and compellable witness regarding events connected to allegations of family violence and abuse of process.

The Defendant relied on an alleged telephone call to police, an email authored by opposing counsel, opposing counsel’s participation by telephone in a meeting involving the children and police, and correspondence with the Defendant’s accountant. The Defendant alleged that opposing counsel participated in efforts to secure his arrest, undermine a parenting order, and alienate the children.

The Court held that removing counsel was an extraordinary remedy available only in the clearest cases. Justice Loparco emphasized that Courts of inherent jurisdiction had supervisory power over the litigation before them but that such power was exercised in tension with the established right of retaining counsel of choice. The governing standard in determining whether the removal of counsel is required is objective and subject to a high degree of restraint. The Defendant had to establish that counsel would likely provide material evidence on a contested issue and that the proper administration of justice required removal. The mere possibility that counsel might testify is insufficient.

Loparco J. found that the allegations rested largely on inference and characterization, rather than on admissions in the record. The documents spoke for themselves, and other witnesses could provide testimony on the relevant events. The Defendant could not manufacture a basis for disqualification by suing opposing counsel or declaring an intention to call counsel at Trial.

Removing counsel would also cause substantial expense and delay in an Action that the Court of Appeal had directed should proceed to Trial promptly. Justice Loparco found that the Application was, in significant part, a collateral attack on prior Orders and was a continuation of a sustained campaign of personal attacks on opposing counsel. The presence of additional relief on the Application for removal, including for deemed admissions under Rule 6.37(3), refused Undertakings, and contempt, suggested the Application’s collateral purpose.

The Court dismissed the Application. The Defendant had not established that opposing counsel was likely to be a material witness or that the administration of justice required his removal. Justice Loparco noted that the Trial Judge could address any discrete issue if counsel’s evidence later became necessary and unavailable from another source. The Court directed the parties to complete the remaining litigation steps and arrange to finalize a Trial Order.