The Applicants, beneficiaries of the Estate of Kenneth Munro Stephenson (the “Estate”), sought to have two Applications, one for civil contempt and one to dispense with the passing of formal accounts, reassigned from the Case Management Justice to a different Judge. The Applicants argued that under Rule 4.15, their consent was required for the Case Management Justice to hear the Applications because they were akin to a Trial or Streamlined Trial, given their reliance on affidavits, written and oral submissions, and their final determinative nature. The Respondents contended that Rule 4.15 did not apply, and that reassignment would be inefficient, given the Case Management Justice’s significant involvement.

Justice Feasby outlined the case management process, noting it begins with a Rule 4.10 Case Conference where a Chambers Justice determines the suitability of case management. If appropriate, a Case Management Justice is appointed under Rule 4.13 to promote fairness, efficiency, and timely resolution of disputes, consistent with the foundational principles of Rule 1.2. Further, Feasby J. highlighted that the Parties remain responsible under Rule 4.1 for managing disputes promptly and cost-effectively, regardless of whether any case management under Rules 4.10 or 4.13 is ongoing.

Feasby J. clarified that while Rule 4.15 prohibits a Case Management Justice from presiding over a Trial or Streamlined Trial without all Parties’ consent, it must be read alongside Rule 4.14(2), which requires that the Case Management Justice hear all related Applications unless otherwise ordered. Justice Feasby noted that Rule 4.15 is a narrow exception to the general requirement of judicial continuity. Justice Feasby further explained that Rule 4.15 only applies to proceedings that are trial-like, meaning those involving oral testimony and credibility findings. Feasby J. emphasized that Applications based solely on written evidence do not meet this threshold.

Applying this interpretation, the Court held that neither Application engaged Rule 4.15. The civil contempt Application, proceeding on Affidavit evidence, was not trial-like. Similarly, the Application to dispense with the passing of accounts was not inherently trial-like. Feasby J. noted that under Surrogate Rule 113, such Applications can be dealt with informally or summarily unless directed to proceed to Trial or a trial-like hearing, and no such direction had been made.

The Applicants also raised concerns that the Case Management Justice had prejudged issues or made inappropriate comments. Justice Feasby found these arguments irrelevant to the Rule 4.15 analysis, which only addresses whether consent of the Parties is required, not allegations of judicial bias. Feasby J. reiterated that any allegations of bias must be addressed through a proper recusal Application made directly to the Judge in question, not indirectly through a Rule 4.15 Application. Feasby J. deemed the Applicants’ approach an improper attempt to seek recusal under the guise of a procedural objection.

In conclusion, the Court dismissed the Application, finding it was without merit and improper.