TAYLOR v ALBERTA (MINISTER OF JUSTICE AND SOLICITOR GENERAL)

The Applicant sought an extension of time and permission to appeal two procedural Orders granted on October 2, 2025 (the “Procedural Orders”) and permission to appeal a December 5, 2025 Order dismissing his Application to vacate those Procedural Orders (the “Dismissal Order”). The Procedural Orders, among other things, transferred the matter from Edmonton to Calgary with the parties’ consent, consolidated the Application with another Calgary proceeding involving the Applicant, and barred the Applicant from bringing new Applications related to a residential tenancy dispute without leave of the Court.

Since the Applicant failed to appeal the Procedural Orders within the one-month time frame mandated by Rule 14.8(2)(a)(iii), the Court applied the test from Cairns v Cairns, 4 DLR 819 (ABCA) to determine whether an extension of time should be granted. While the Court found that the Applicant intended to challenge the Procedural Orders within the Appeal period, it concluded that the Applicant failed to provide an adequate explanation for the delay. Furthermore, Justice Strekaf held that the proposed Appeal had no reasonable chance of success. The Procedural Orders were discretionary case-management decisions entitled to significant deference on appeal, and there was no error of law or unreasonable exercise of discretion warranting appellate intervention.

Regarding permission to appeal, the Court held that both the Procedural Orders and the Dismissal Order fell within Rule 14.5(1)(b) as pre-trial "case-flow" or scheduling decisions requiring permission to appeal.  Permission was also required under Rule 14.5(1)(d) because the transfer Order had been granted on consent. Applying the test for permission to appeal, Strekaf J.A. concluded that the Applicant failed to meet the criteria for permission because the proposed Appeals raised no important questions of law or precedent and would unduly delay the resolution of the underlying proceeding.

The Court emphasized that the Chambers Judges properly exercised their broad authority pursuant to Rule 1.4 to manage case flow, including transferring the venue, directing case management, and requiring leave for future Applications. These discretionary Orders were reasonable attempts to avoid bifurcated proceedings and were entitled to deference.

In the result, the Applications were dismissed.