TERRIGNO v BRISTOWE

This case concerned two Applications for permission to appeal arising from a Rule 4.33 long delay proceeding in a defamation Action. The Plaintiff sought leave to appeal two decisions: first, the Chambers Justice’s refusal to adjourn the long delay Application and, second, the administrative direction transferring the matter from an Applications Judge to Justice Chambers.

On the adjournment issue, the Court emphasized that a decision to grant an adjournment is discretionary and attracts substantial deference on appeal. Because permission to appeal was required under Rule 14.5(1)(b), the Applicant had to show an important question of law or precedent, a reasonable chance of success, and that the interlocutory appeal would not unduly hinder the Action or cause undue prejudice without proportionate benefit.

Strekaf J.A. held those requirements were not met. The record showed that when the Applications Judge adjourned the long delay Application to permit Questioning, he expressly stated that the return date could address either any loose end issues or the merits of the Application. After Questioning, the Applicant did not file any application to compel answers to refused questions or undertakings. In those circumstances, the Chambers Justice did not err in refusing a further adjournment, and the proposed appeal raised no important question of law and had no reasonable chance of success.

On the transfer issue, the Court treated the direction moving the matter to Justice Chambers as an internal judicial assignment decision. Strekaf J.A. noted that the Court of King’s Bench has inherent authority to control and manage its own proceedings, and that judicial assignments generally fall within the Chief Justice’s administrative authority. The Applicant argued that the Applications Judge had become seized of the matter, but the Court rejected that submission. It held that the Applications Judge had not begun hearing the substance of the long delay Application and therefore was not seized of it merely because he had earlier scheduled a return date and contemplated that it might deal with either procedural matters or the merits. Even assuming such an administrative direction were appealable, it would attract considerable deference, and the Applicant had not shown any important question of law or any reasonable prospect of success.

Both Applications for permission to appeal were therefore dismissed.