CARBONE v DAWES, 2024 ABCA 13

STREKAF JA

14.5: Appeals only with permission

Case Summary

The Applicant sought permission to Appeal a decision dismissing her Application to vary a Scheduling Order in respect of a Security for Costs Application filed by the Respondents. The Applicant commenced an Action for alleged wrongdoings in relation to a cosmetic surgery. The Respondents filed Security for Costs Applications. An Applications Judge granted a scheduling Order for the Security for Costs Applications, which was varied. The revised schedule required the Applicant to conduct cross-examination on Affidavits between September 14 and 22, and to file and serve all Affidavit evidence by September 29.

The Applicant did not receive the transcripts of the cross-examination before her Affidavits were due, and applied on September 28 for an extension. The Chambers Judge determined that the deadlines in the scheduling Order were peremptory on the Applicant, and she could have requested expedited transcripts. The Application was therefore dismissed, and the Applicant was required to file her Affidavit evidence the next day. The Applicant served unfiled copies of her Affidavit evidence on September 29, and filed copies on October 3. The Applicant sought to Appeal the Decision.

The Court of Appeal considered whether permission to Appeal was required, pursuant to Rule 14.5. Justice Strekaf noted that Rule 14.5 requires permission to Appeal any pre-Trial decision respecting adjournments, time periods, or time limits, or on Applications to vary an Order scheduling limitation steps. Strekaf J.A. determined that Rule 14.5 therefore applied, and permission to Appeal was required.

The Court stated that, to obtain permission to Appeal under Rule 14.5, the Applicant must establish: (1) a serious question of general importance; (2) a reasonable chance of success on Appeal; and (3) that the Appeal will not unduly hinder the progress of the Action or cause undue prejudice without any proportionate benefit.

On the first branch, a “serious question of general importance” was stated as a matter of policy, principle, or law that might have precedential value. The Court determined that the Applicant did not meet this part of the test, as the Applicant argued that Chambers Judge was not impartial and denied her procedural fairness. These were not serious questions of general importance, nor did they have a reasonable chance of success. The Application was dismissed.

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