This was an Appeal from a prior decision to strike the Appellants claim against the Respondents alleging unjust enrichment and dismissal of the Appellants Application for Summary Judgment.

The Chambers Justice granted the Respondents Application to strike pursuant to Rule 3.68, for failure to disclose a cause of Action, constituting an abuse of process. In addition, the Chambers Justice ordered that the Appellants obtain leave of the Court to commence any Action alleging the same or substantially the same facts against the Respondents. The Court stated a decision to strike under Rule 3.68 is entitled to deference unless there has been an error of law. The Court determined that questions of whether a Pleading discloses a cause of Action or constitutes an abuse of process, are questions of law subject to review on a correctness standard.

The Court determined that the Chambers Justice was correct in finding no reasonable cause of Action and that the claim was an abuse of process. The Appellants unjust enrichment claim arose from the sale of property, which was approved by Court Order. The Court determined the sale agreement’s approval by Court Order was a juristic reason for the enrichment. The Court noted the Order was never appealed and remained valid. The Court further stated that the Appellants allegations were a collateral attack on the Court Order to undermine its validity, which can be struck as an abuse of process. Despite the Appellants argument that their claim was equitable and should have been decided on the merits, the Court stated Rule 3.68 remains a valid procedure to end claims which have no reasonable prospect of success, applicable to claims in both law and equity.

The Appellants argued that the Chambers Justice, in issuing the requirement to obtain leave, did not follow the required procedure in obtaining a vexatious litigant Order pursuant to the Judicature Act, RSA 2000 c J-2. The Court rejected this argument, noting that the Chambers Justice expressly declined to issue a vexatious litigant Order. The Court stated that the Chambers Justice considered that the leave requirement to be reasonable under Rule 3.68 and the Court’s inherent jurisdiction to control its processes. The Court also emphasized that the narrow scope of the leave requirement did not cause any significant prejudice to the Appellants, rendering intervention unnecessary.

The Court dismissed the Appeal and invoked Rule 9.4(2)(c) authorizing the Court clerk to sign the Judgment.