STRAWSON v STRAWSON, 2024 ABCA 126
SLATTER, KIRKER AND FETH JJA
4.16: Dispute resolution processes
4.18: Judicial dispute resolution process
4.19: Documents resulting from judicial dispute resolution
4.21: Involvement of judge after process concludes
9.13: Re-opening case
13.5: Variation of time periods
14.5: Appeals only with permission
Case Summary
The Appellant appealed the Decision of the lower Court granting Judgment following a binding Judicial Dispute Resolution (“JDR”) process, undertaken pursuant to Rules 4.16 and 4.18. At issue was the finality of the JDR process, the ability of the JDR Judge to clarify or vary the Decision, and the need for permission to Appeal the resulting Judgment.
The parties were engaged in a high-conflict matrimonial dispute. They agreed to a binding JDR. The parties attended the JDR and, although it was not wholly successful, an Order resulted which included provisions to which the parties had agreed. The JDR Judge then followed up with a letter containing further findings. The letter contained ambiguities and ultimately appeared to vary the Order. The Appellant appealed the findings of the JDR Judge for exceeding his jurisdiction by varying his final Judgment by letter, without notice, and for endorsing an Order that was inconsistent with the Judgment.
The Court reiterated that records arising from a JDR are limited by Rule 4.19 and, if agreement is not reached, Rule 4.21 prohibits the JDR Judge from being involved in any subsequent Application or Trial of the Action without the parties’ consent. Similarly, it highlighted that the opinion of a JDR Judge is not an adjudication of the dispute in a technical sense, as the rules of evidence and conventional court process are not followed.
As the parties consented to a binding JDR, the Order seeking to be appealed was made by consent and permission would ordinarily be required to Appeal pursuant to Rule 14.5. This would require the Appellant to explain why it should be entitled to side-step its agreement to proceed with a binding JDR, showing an important question of law or precedent, a reasonable prospect of success, and that an Appeal would not prejudice the other party. However, given the complication in this case arising from the letter of the JDR Judge, the Appeal was allowed.
On the substance of the Appeal, the Court found that the JDR Judge had wide discretion on how to conduct the session and was not bound by the ordinary rules of evidence or court procedure. There was no procedural unfairness found in how the JDR Judge conducted the JDR and subsequent hearings. Regarding the letter, the Court found that it was not objectionable for the JDR Judge to clarify his original intention and that, as the Order was not entered, the Judge was entitled to vary it pursuant to Rule 9.13.
The Appellant argued that the JDR Judge was prohibited from any further involvement two weeks following the JDR as the JDR Agreement provided that the parties could apply to the Justice only within that time frame. The Court found that this was a misinterpretation of the Agreement and, similar to the flexibility provided to a Trial Judge by Rule 13.5, the time limits could be varied.
Ultimately, the Court dismissed the Appeal.
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