The Appellant had filed a complaint with the Alberta Human Rights Commission against her former employer, which resulted in the Alberta Human Rights Tribunal upholding her complaint and awarding her damages. The Appellant disagreed with the damages and filed an Originating Application for Judicial Review of the Tribunal’s decision (the “Judicial Review Application”). The Appellant properly served the Judicial Review Application on the Respondent and the Tribunal. However, she did not serve the Minister of Justice of Alberta in the six month period required under Rule 3.15(3). The Respondent successfully applied for the Judicial Review Application to be struck on the basis that the Minister was not served in accordance with the Rules. The Appellant appealed the Chamber Judge’s Decision.

The Court affirmed that Rule 3.15 is strictly enforced, including the mandatory service requirements and six-month timeline. This stems from the Rule’s exclusion of Rule 13.5, which otherwise allows for extensions, and because it aligns with the policy objective of maintaining timely and orderly judicial reviews.

The Appellant did not take issue with the strict enforcement of the time limits in Rule 3.15, rather she argued that the requirement under Rule 3.15(3)(b) to serve the Minister is an exception because of the additional wording “as circumstances require” and because, practically, the Minister rarely participated in judicial review applications. The Appellant also argued that since the Minister was ultimately served, more than a year late, but did not request a remedy for the late service or engage in the proceedings, that the Minister essentially waived the service requirement or the defect in service. Additionally, the Appellant contended that service on the Tribunal should suffice as service on the Minister.

The Court disagreed with the Appellant’s arguments finding that Rule 3.15(3)(b) reflects Canada’s division of powers by acknowledging that either the provincial or federal government, or both, may have an interest in a judicial review depending on the circumstances. Therefore, the relevant government offices must be served within the six-month deadline, which the Court held was the only reasonable interpretation of the Rule. The Court also dismissed the Appellant’s argument that the late service on the Minister should be excused on account of the Minister not participating in the proceedings, citing that the Minister’s role in judicial review is to oversee challenges to public authority decisions, and that the obligation to serve the Minister is not contingent on their participation. The Court did not consider whether waiver of service is permitted by Rule 3.15 because the Appellant acknowledged that the Minister had not expressly waived the service requirement or service defect.

The Court also dismissed the argument that service on the Tribunal suffices as service on the Minister because the Tribunal is an independent public agency, and its relationship with the Minister, either statutorily or contractually, is irrelevant. Ultimately, the Court noted that it would undermine the public oversight role of the Minister and create uncertainty for other parties involved if judicial review applications were allowed to proceed despite service defects. The Appeal was dismissed.