The Applicants sought permission to appeal a decision subjecting them to indefinite Court access restrictions and designating them as vexatious litigants (the “Application”). Woolley J. dismissed the Application.

Justice Woolley stated that whether leave to appeal ought to be granted pursuant to Rule 14.5(1)(j) depends on the answer to the following questions: (1) Is there an important question of law or precedent; (2) is there a reasonable chance of success on appeal; and (3) will the delay unduly hinder the progress of the Action or cause undue prejudice?

The Court further stated that other considerations include whether there is a possible error of law; whether a discretion has been unreasonably exercised; whether the Chambers Judge misapprehended important facts; whether there are conflicting decisions on the point; the standard of review that would be applied on the Appeal; and whether there are other good reasons why a full panel of the Court should review the Order under Appeal.

Woolley J. noted that the Decision to declare a party a vexatious litigant is a discretionary one, to which deferential standard of review applies. That deferential standard of review must be factored into the assessment of whether the Applicants have a reasonable chance of success on Appeal.

It was held that none of the errors alleged by the Applicants constituted an important question of law or precedent that would have a reasonable chance of success on Appeal. The Chambers Judge’s factual findings were entitled to deference and did not warrant appellate intervention.

Justice Woolley was satisfied that granting leave would cause significant prejudice to the Respondents, who had been engaged in years of litigation across multiple jurisdictions, and that the time and expense of further litigation on questions with no broader legal significance ought not to be imposed upon the Respondents.