This Decision concerned: the Applicant’s self-appointment as administrator of and litigation representative for an estate (the “Estate”); the ability of the Applicant to appeal a Master’s Order regarding foreclosure on a condominium owned by the Estate (the “Condominium”); and issues surrounding personal property in the Condominium.

The Applicant was the nephew of the deceased. The Applicant’s mother, the deceased’s sister, became personal representative of the Estate. The Royal Bank of Canada (“RBC”) initiated foreclosure proceedings in relation to the Condominium, and the Estate was found in default and foreclosure was granted by a Master. The Applicant filed an Application to appeal the Master’s Order, indicating that he was a self-appointed litigation representative pursuant to Rule 2.14. Associate Chief Justice Rooke had previously stayed the Applicant’s Appeal because the Estate’s personal representative was the Applicant’s mother, and because the Applicant had not filed an Affidavit in support of his self-appointment, as required by Rule 2.14.

The Applicant had now filed the required Affidavit, and Rooke A.C.J. ordered that the Applicant replace his mother as personal representative of the Estate pursuant to Rule 2.21. His Lordship found that there was evidence showing that the Estate’s affairs would not be completed in a timely manner if the Applicant’s mother were not replaced, and that the Applicant would discharge these responsibilities appropriately.

In previous proceedings, it was determined that the Applicant could not advance an Appeal on behalf of the Estate because the Applicant had not satisfied the criteria to be a self-appointed litigation representative. Having satisfied these criteria and having now been appointed as personal representative of the Estate, the Applicant could now pursue the Appeal. However, Rooke A.C.J. noted that the Estate must be represented by a lawyer to appear in Court pursuant to section 106(1) of the Legal Profession Act, RSA 2000, c L-8. Therefore, His Lordship, pursuant to Rule 1.4(1)(h), extended the deadline to appeal a Master’s Order under Rule 6.14(2) to allow the Applicant to retain counsel on behalf of the Estate.

With respect to the personal property located in the Condominium, Associate Chief Justice Rooked held that RBC had the right to treat this property as abandoned pursuant to Rule 9.28. His Lordship ordered that this property be inventoried and transported to storage by RBC to be stored for a period of one month, during which time the Applicant would have access to the property.

Associate Chief Justice Rooke ruled that the Applicant’s approval of the Order granted was dispensed with pursuant to Rule 9.4(2)(c).